What is Wrong with Skepticism?
By: Mark McNeil
Human knowledge begins with a flood of sensory data. When a child is born into the world, and even prior to that birth, its awareness is formed by a world that imposes itself on the child or, to say the same in another way, "presents” itself to the child. Philosophy, or the reasoned reflection on the world of experience and its ultimate structures, is the mature reflection on that “given” data of experience. That this account is in fact the correct one is evident in our own experience as well as observing that of others.
For instance, a child discovers the world of experience to be quite unlike that of the imagination. Imagination, being a kind of willful “production” of a private world, is arranged and organized in accord with the wishes of the mind producing it. The world of experience, however, presents itself as something other than the mind, sometimes in abrupt ways. The child pulling himself up by a coffee table, for instance, has a direct and immediate apprehension of reality whenever he slips and strikes his chin on the hard wood or glass. The table is then discovered as something quite different from the private world of the mind. Instead, the table is part of the world that “gives” itself to me through the senses.
It is from this experience of the external world, as contrasted with the “internal” world of my imagination, that I am prompted to investigate the nature and meaning of that world. For one, I discover through a reflexive act of the mind that the various experiences had through the senses all “hold together” in a continuous stream of consciousness. The unity of that “stream” and my ability to move at will between the various sensory impressions themselves is evidence of a “self” that is having the experiences. The self is simply the term given to the subject in which the various experiences inhere or hold together. It is the location and reality that is having the sensory experiences. Without such a conclusion, one is left with the entirely unacceptable account that there are merely sensory experiences but with no one experiencing them.
Second, in addition to the discovery of the “self” by reflexive analysis, the knowing subject also discovers that reality is not exhausted by the objects known through sense experience. This is evident in the material world by the fact that scientific investigation is driven by the search for causes or underlying explanations and structures of reality, many of which are not seen at the time they are initially suggested. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the mind “discovers” various meaningful features of life by and through those things experienced but which things themselves are not seen with the senses. One might think of the experience of love. This central motivating force and reality of human life is known by way of actions expressing love while love itself is not seen. Also, the mind also moves beyond the sensory creatures experienced to question the ultimate source and cause that would be necessary to explain their existence. This, of course, is a line of reasoning that presupposes that such creatures do not explain themselves and such is a conclusion that is rather self-evident upon examining any one of them. The causes outside myself needed to account for my present existence are countless and only serve as an example of the contingency of the world of experience.
The mind then discovers that knowledge, though beginning with the senses and the sensory experience of the world outside itself, extends to immaterial subjects, like the self and God (the ultimate cause of the visible order of things).
The working principle of axiom behind the reasoning described above is the “givenness” of the external world (external here is contrasted with the internal world of the mind). If this is in fact where knowledge begins, we might be able to predict that any attempt to begin with its denial, is sure to lead to skepticism. If all knowledge, even of spiritual or immaterial realities, is ultimately “seen” in the mind through reflection on the world of experience, then the attempt to “prove” knowledge of any sort by another way will prove itself without a sufficient or satisfactory foundation.
Skepticism is the denial of philosophical knowledge to human persons. By philosophical knowledge here I mean a sure knowledge of the answers to ultimate philosophical questions (e.g., self, God, causality). There are a variety of forms that skepticism may take and a host of reasons why a person would choose to adopt such a disposition. With the more personal of these we have no present interest.
With most instances of skepticism, however, there is an attempt to attack our experience of the world and the assumption described above that it is trustworthy and meaningful as a guide to posing and answering philosophical questions.
A common way to launch the skeptical position is to propose an alternative explanation of the world of experience. For instance, “How do you know that the world is not merely a projection of your mind?” It is with this common proposal that I wish to take issue in this section and will do so with a series of responses.
First, it must be noted that this question, “How do you know…,” is equal to an attack on the possibility of knowledge altogether. If in fact knowledge is bound up with the senses and our experience of the world, to deny the possibility of that source of knowledge is, even if unwittingly, to attack the very possibility of knowing altogether. It is to challenge the skeptic’s opponent by insisting that he produce another source of knowledge in order to justify the one he finds “given” in his experience. It is much like asking you to prove there is an external world without appealing to the external world. It is equal to ruling out our intuitive awareness of reality, the most clear and obvious way to know and have certitude of things, and insisting that another way be provided.
The reader should understand the significance of this move. If human beings are as we seem, bodily creatures capable of intellectual reflection only consequent to our sensory experience through the body, we cannot “prove” reality by any other way than the mode of knowing available to beings like ourselves. In other words, the skeptical challenge can only be met if we were creatures with a different way of knowing. In fact, in the final analysis the skeptical challenge could only be met if we were ourselves God since any finite mode of knowing would be unable to transcend itself to verify the knowing powers themselves.
Second, I wish to turn the question, “How do you know…,” on the skeptic. How does he know that our sensory experience of the world is not reliable? In other words, it is not enough to simply propose some possibility. Mere possibility does not make a theory worthy of consideration. Possibility coupled with reasons in support of it makes a position respectable or at least potentially so. When I am asked, “Why do you believe the senses give to us real knowledge of the external world?” I am able to respond with a variety of answers. For one, the world presents itself to us in that way and we spontaneously and naturally treat it as a means of real knowledge. Secondly, the world of experience is fully consistent with the assumption of its objectivity. Standing in front of a moving car does in fact bring death or harm to a person or object. The baby does feel pain when his chin strikes the coffee table. The car does in fact stop moving when it runs out of gas. Human life is filled with the unexpected and expected consequences that are predictable based upon the natural and spontaneous awareness of a real world existing apart from my mind.
On the other hand, the world is not what I would expect if it were merely the product of my mind. My mind is unable to manipulate its contents. The bills are still due at the beginning of the month whether I want them to be or not. What I know of the imagination and the mind’s ability to project simply do not explain the world of my experience with respect to the external world.
Those who claim that the mind or brain is capable of producing a sensory world that really has no objectivity outside the mind or brain itself, are assuming they have knowledge enough of their own self that could support such a conclusion. My question in reply, of course, is simply, How do you know you have a brain? Those who assume the ability of the mind to produce reality are working off the “knowledge” of the brain as a sophisticated organ. The obvious problem is that such knowledge is based on the ability to examine such a brain to show its powers but such examination is rooted in our sensory knowledge of it. If they wish to argue that the mind exists immaterially apart from a material organ (brain), my challenge is concerning the source of this knowledge. In the account given above, knowledge of the self is by way of reflexive analysis following upon sense experience. Denying that sense experience is helpful towards true knowledge leaves one with only a collection of ideas in the mind which reveal nothing about reality. Not only is such a theory dishonest insofar as it does not grant that its knowledge is ultimately derived from sense experience (the very things questioned as helpful) but it is self-stultifying. One may no longer speak of a “self” at all.
The same may be said of all the common arguments questioning the reliability of sense experience. It is certain that the senses sometime are “deceived” or incorrectly perceive a matter. It is also clear that someone may be so “biased” towards an issue that he incorrectly perceives it. These complexities of human experience, as problematic as they may be, all assume that deception and error can be detected by more careful examination. Therefore the senses are used to correct the errors of the senses. This action of correction presupposes the basic and general reliability of sense perception while it also allows room for a more nuanced explanation of perception and its mistakes. None of these “mistakes,” however, is a sound basis for the universal rejection of human knowledge since they actually serve to prove the rule since they may be “discovered” and corrected.
In this brief paper, my goal has been to state a positive view of human knowledge as it is actually experienced. Sense experience serves as the primary data of our knowledge but our knowledge is not restricted to it. Instead, we know the world outside our minds and thereby discover the fact and nature of our minds through an inward turn and we also reach beyond the world of experience as we are impelled to do so by the data of experience itself.
My second goal was to use this basic approach to knowledge in order to expose the weaknesses of skepticism. Skepticism, in the radical form we considered it, seeks to challenge the possibility of certitude with respect to the world of experience and therefore, by extension, certitude of anything else meaningful that would reach beyond sense experience. This entire approach is unacceptable because it sets up the problem of knowledge in such a way that it cannot be answered by humans since they would have to have another kind of nature in order to “verify” the perceptions of their own. Second, it was found unacceptable because it has no real positive case that can be offered for its skeptical alternatives. If the skeptic is merely wishing to show that he can question everything, what else is new? The ability to say, “How do you know…,” in reply to every claim is, to my mind, rather childish and unhelpful. Those who do not think we can know anything ought not to act as if they do know everything by insisting knowledge is impossible. Instead, those who have something positive to contribute ought to do so and seek to answer serious and constructive challenges.
Skepticism, however, is, far too often, merely a “game” much like the endless question, “Why?” often by playful children. The game may be fun at times, but it is not helpful in the pursuit of knowledge. I know there is a world outside myself because I see, hear, taste, smell, and touch it. Everyone will live life assenting to its reality but there are a few who will attempt to divide what is known to be true in everyday life from what is granted philosophically. They are free to make this choice but by doing so they have, if consistent, destroyed the very source of knowledge and truth given to the human person.
Mark A. McNeil
1-12-02